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iii.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

*

Case No. 20000280-CA

*
*

VS.

DON BROKMEYER,
Defendant/Appellant

*

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure because the entry of the judgment on March 20,
2000 is considered to be the final decision of the District Court. See also Utah
Code §78-2a-3 (2) (e).
The Notice of Appeal was filed on March 31, 2000, within 30 days of the
entry of judgment. Thus, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, this appeal is timely.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue presented for review is whether the district court erred in denying
Mr. Brokmeyer's suppression motion [R. 9-13]. Legal determinations regarding
reasonable suspicion made by the trial court are to be broadly reviewed for
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correctness, with the Appellate Court affording a measure of discretion to the trial
court in the application of the correctness standard. State v. Chapman. 921 P.2d
446 (Utah 1996); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). The factual
findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Friesen. 988
P.2d 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable case supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
Warrants shall issue but upon probable case supported
by Oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
Mr. Brokmeyer appeals from his conviction following the entry of his

conditional pleas of guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code § 58-37-8 and Expired Registration, a
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Class "C" misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code § 41-1a-1303. Specifically, Mr.
Brokmeyer challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
1.

On January 19, 2000, Mr. Brokmeyer was charged in a one-count

Information with Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony, in
violation of Utah Code § 58-37-8 [R. 1]. The Information was later amended to
include two additional counts: No Insurance, a Class "B" Misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code § 41-12a-302, and Expired Registration, a Class "C"
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code § 41-1 a-1303 [R. 7-8].
2.

On February 17, 2000, both the preliminary hearing and Mr.

Brokmeyer's hearing on his pretrial motion to suppress evidence. The
suppression motion was denied that same day [R. 28].
3.

On March 17, 2000, the trial court entered Mr. Brokmeyer's

conditional pleas of guilty to unlawful possession and expired registration. State
v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)[R. 28].
C.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.
The sentencing was held on March 20, 2000 [R. 22-23]. At that time, the

trial court sentenced Mr. Brokmeyer to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison
and imposed a fine in the amount of one thousand five-hundred eighty-seven
dollars ($1,587.00) [R. 22-23]. The trial court stayed execution of the prison
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sentence and placed Mr. Brokmeyer on informal probation to the court for twentyfour (24) months on the conditions that he pay the fine and he violate no Federal,
State or Municipal laws [R. 22-23]. The Notice of Appeal was filed timely on
March 31, 2000 [R. 25-26].
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the No Warrant Arrest Fact Sheet, dated January 14, 2000, and attested
to by the arresting officer, Deputy Glenn Begay, on January 14, 2000, at 6:21
p.m., Mr. Brokmeyer's vehicle was stopped for no license plate lights [R. 28, pg.
24]. Mr. Brokmeyer's companion, Ms. Manelly, was driving the vehicle [R. 28, pg.
8-9]. Upon approaching the vehicle, Deputy Begay saw marijuana seeds on the
driver's floorboard [R. 28, pg. 8-9]. Deputy Begay asked Mr. Brokmeyer if there
were any other controlled substances present [R. 28, pg. 16]. Mr. Brokmeyer
stated that he had psilocybin in his jacket pocket [R. 28, pg. 16]. Mr. Brokmeyer
was arrested [R. 28, pg. 20].
At the preliminary hearing1, Deputy Begay added that after seeing the
marijuana seeds on the floorboard, he noticed a small package of psilocybin in
the ashtray [R. 28, pg. 9]. Deputy Begay further testified that while possession of
marijuana seeds was, in and of itself, a criminal act he did not seize the seeds [R.
28 pg. 38]. Deputy Begay did not cite Mr. Brokmeyer or Ms. Manelly for

The testimony at the preliminary hearing was used for the suppression
motion [R. 28, pg. 22].
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possession of the marijuana seeds, rather, he released the vehicle and the
marijuana seeds to Ms. Manelly [R. 28, pg. 38].
With respect to identifying either substance, Deputy Begay was unable to
provide much information other than he had seen both illicit substances during his
training. When he was asked to describe marijuana with some detail, his
response was that the substance would "look like marijuana' or that "it had a look
of its own." [R. 28, pg. 25-28]. The deputy was unable to testify how marijuana
was ingested. [R. 28, pg. 27]. With respect to marijuana seeds, the deputy
testified as follows:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

And what do seeds look like?
They look like marijuana seeds.
Okay. And can you give me a little bit more of a
description in terms of color, size, weight?
They're small.
How small?
Urn, I don't know what —how much of a
dimension of small you want, or —
Give me another thing that is comparable to it. Is
it like a poppy seed? Like a tomato seed? What
is it like?
It's like a marijuana seed.
But you can't give me any more of a description
than that?
It's got a look of it's own.
And has [sic] that look?
A marijuana seed.
And you can't describe to me any distinct coloring.
You can't describe to me any distinct size,
shape, anything-anything distinct about
marijuana?
No.
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[R. 28, pg. 29].
The deputy's description of psilocybin was equally lacking: it was "dried"
as opposed to "fluid" and that it looked "like the quarter portion of a mushroom on
the top part of it" [R. 28, pg. 12-13].
The deputy testified that he received training to include all of the important
and significant facts in his arrest reports [R. 28, pg. 33]. He testified that he was
also taught to be thorough in his reports [R. 28, pg. 34].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is well established that a detention is constitutionally permissible only
where (1) the officer's action was reasonably justified at its inception and (2) "the
resulting detention was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
justified the interference in the first place." State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 113132 (Utah 1994)(quoting Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
LEd.2d 889 (1968).
Deputy Begay's stop of the vehicle due to a minor equipment was
constitutionally permissible. The 'resulting detention' was not 'reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place'.
The deputy initially justifies expanding the stop on the basis that he saw
marijuana seeds. Yet, he was unable to describe a marijuana seed. In addition,
although the deputy concedes that possession of the seeds is illegal, he allows
the driver to continue on her way with the seeds in her possession.
6

In his initial report, the deputy indicated that when he asked about
additional controlled substances, Mr. Brokmeyer admitted possessing psilocybin.
There was absolutely no indication that the deputy saw the psilocybin prior to
expanding the scope. When the deputy testified, however, he justified his actions
based, in part, on the psilocybin in the ashtray. Similar to the marijuana seeds,
he was unable to give much of a description of the psilocybin. Thus, under the
circumstances, the trial court erred in finding the scope of the stop justified.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
A.

WITHOUT CORROBORATION OF DEPUTY BEGAY'S CLAIM THAT HE
SAW MARIJUANA SEEDS. THE SEARCH SHOULD BE HELD INVALID.
In Utah v. Mavcock. 947 P.2d 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), this Court

addressed the issue of corroboration. There, the officer justified expanding the
stop based on the smell of burnt marijuana. No marijuana was found during the
search. This Court held that a search based on an officer's purely subjective
belief that there was an odor of burnt marijuana must be corroborated by finding
evidence of either the substance or its use.
Here, while the trial court did address the Maycock case, it failed to take
into account the reasoning underlying the holding. Instead, the trial court simply
concluded that Maycock was inapplicable because it dealt with the issue of smell
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as opposed to sight.
The trial court essentially relied on the 'plain view' doctrine. See
generally. State v. Romero. 660 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1983)(setting forth a threeprong test for the plain view exception: (1) lawful presence of the trooper; (2)
evidence in plain view and (3) clearly incriminating). Such reliance is misplaced
given Deputy Begay was unable to specifically describe a marijuana seed.
Moreover, the trial court failed to take into account the reasoning underlying
the decision of Mavcock:
If this were a case of an alert by a trained drug sniffing
dog with a good record, we would not require
corroboration to establish probable cause. The dog
would have no reason to make a false alert. But for a
human sniffer, an officer with an incentive to find
evidence of illegal activities and to justify his actions
when he searched without consent, we believe
constitutional rights are endangered if limitations are not
imposed.
id. citing. States v. Nielsen. 9 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1993)(emphasis added).
In the case at hand, the deputy, by virtue of being a law enforcement
officer, has an incentive to find evidence of illegal activities. That he was later
unable to describe a marijuana seed shows that his initial identification is little
more than a hunch. That his hunch turned out right makes no difference, because
it is clear the search must be justified at its inception.
That an assumption is insufficient is illustrated in the case of Friesen.
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There, the officer assumed that under Wyoming law, a motorist was required to
have both the front and rear license plates. Based on that assumption, the officer
initiated a traffic stop. This Court rejected that assumption as sufficient
justification, stating:
To enforce the law, an officer must know what the law is
and what it prohibits . . . The trooper in this instance did
not have a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal
activity when he stopped Friesen. The only articulable
and specific fact known to him when he stopped Friesen
was that Friesen's car had only a rear plate and that
some states require vehicles to display front license
plates. Having no specific knowledge about Wyoming's
licensing requirements, he made the decision to stop
Friesen only because he presumed that Friesen violated
Wyoming's motor vehicle law, and that such a violation
might be an indicator of other, possibly more serious,
offenses as well.
Id. at p.11.
Here, Deputy Begay did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion of
criminal activity when he questioned the Mr. Brokmeyer and his companion about
the marijuana seeds and the presence of other controlled substances. The only
articulable and specific fact known to him when he made the stop was that there
was a minor equipment violation. Having no specific knowledge about marijuana
seeds, other than they are 'small', or that they have a 'look of their own', is an
insufficient basis for the deputy to justify expanding the scope of the stop.
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B.

DEPUTY BEGAY'S CLAIM THAT HE SAW PS1LQCYBIN SHOULD BE
DISREGARDED.
Shortly after the arrest, Deputy Begay filled out a No Warrant Arrest Fact

Sheet. In that written report, he indicated that the basis for expanding the stop
and conducting the search was the presence of marijuana seeds. He then
questioned the occupants about other controlled substances. Mr. Brokmeyer
replied that he possessed psilocybin.
At the hearing, Deputy Begay testified that he saw the psilocybin in the
ashtray before questioning the occupants about other controlled substances. This
later justification should be rejected for a number of reasons. First, given the
deputy's inability to specifically describe psilocybin, it stands to reason that the
only way that he knew that the substance was psilocybin was based on Mr.
Brokmeyer's admission. Like the marijuana seeds, it defies common sense that
the deputy would be able to recognize the substance yet not be able to offer a
description of it.
In addition, the lack of any information about the psilocybin in the arrest
report renders his later testimony suspect. Even though the deputy testified that
he was trained to include all significant and material facts in his reports, no
mention is made of the psilocybin until the hearing. This is little more than
hindsight reconstruction. Friesen. supra at pg. 12(the justification must take
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place at the time of the stop).
It is clear that Terry and its progeny require that widening the scope of the
stop is based on a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Here, the
officer stops the vehicle for an equipment violation. There is no question that he
was entitled to do so. The problem begins when Deputy Begay starts questioning
the occupants about controlled substances. He impermissibly widened the scope
of the stop. Accordingly, any evidence seized thereafter should be suppressed
as 'fruits' of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471,
83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the trial court's denial the Motion to Suppress.
DATED this 13th day of July, 2000.
/Respectfully submitted:

R02A1IE REWLLY
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have mailed, by first-class mail, postage prepaid, two
accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the Office of the Attorney
General, Appeals Division, 160 East 300 SoutrC6trT¥loor, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114 this 13th day of July, 2000.
/
/ ^
RO^LIE REILLV
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